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Avatars of Oneself 
Patrick Lee Miller 
 
“When I dwell in human form,” says the charioteer of the Bhagavad Gita, “the confused 
ones have contempt for me, not knowing my highest nature as the great lord of 
beings.”1 This charioteer is called Krishna, but only because his divine nature—
Vishnu—is hidden from bodily eyes. The supreme Hindu god has descended from the 
eternal into time, from the immaterial into embodiment, in order to instruct a warrior, 
and through him the rest of us, about the self, reality, and the proper conduct of life. 
Each of us has a divine nature, likewise descended into a human body, but with its 
death we return to another one, and another, and so on, until we recognize who we 
really are. This self-knowledge promises to liberate us from the doleful cycle of birth 
and death into the disembodied unity of pure divinity. Vishnu guarantees that “when 
one sees the multiplicity of states of being abiding in one, and spreading out from that 
one alone, one then arrives at Brahman.”2 
Zoe is an American woman who has found that “drawing the line and standing firm 
has always made me feel like a bitch, and, actually, I feel that people saw me as one 
too.”3 For two years, however, she played an online role-playing game using a male 
character where “as a man I was liberated from all that.” She made mistakes in her 
unfamiliar role, but learned from them. “I got better at being firm but not rigid,” she 
says; “I practiced, safe from criticism.” Case is an American man, who plays a similar 
game but always appears as a woman. He travels within its virtual world, interacts with 
others through their characters, and contemplates why all his own are women. “My 
female characters are interesting,” he says, “because I can say or do the sorts of things 
that I mentally want to do, but if I did them as a man, they would be obnoxious.”4 In 
Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, Sherry Turkle records these and 
other fascinating accounts of people who achieved liberation through online games. 
Both Zoe and Case, despite differing in gender, used them for the same purpose. 
“Playing this woman,” says Case, “lets me see what I have in my psychological 
repertoire.”5 Gender-swapping allowed each to be more assertive, something they 
found difficult to do otherwise. “A virtual gender swap,” writes Turkle, “gave people 




To achieve this liberation, as in Hinduism, they used avatars: appearances of 
themselves in a world less real than the one they fully inhabit. “Avatar” derives from a 
Sanskrit word (avatara) meaning descent, but because of stories like those of the Gita 
the word is also taken to mean incarnation, embodiment, the taking on of flesh. The 
god’s avatar permits him to manifest himself for a time in this world; he is more fully 
elsewhere. The same is true of those who play online games. An avatar may be killing 
dragons atop a steed in cyberspace, but in “meatspace” the real person who plays it is 
sitting before a keyboard in Pittsburgh. To capture this similarity, gaming pioneers 
deliberately adopted the Sanskrit word and Hindu notion, decades before our 
technology made the comparison irresistible. In both cases, after all, an avatar is an 
appearance in one world of someone more real from another. The similarity is not idle. 
It may help us understand who we really are and what we should do with ourselves. 
 
1. Games 
There are too many online games to survey here, but the most interesting for our 
purposes are the MMORPGs: Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games.7 There 
are always new ones, ever more sophisticated in their verisimilitude, but our goal is not 
to keep abreast of even just this one portion of the gaming phenomenon. Our goal, 
instead, is to investigate how these sorts of games resemble the meatspace we inhabit 
with our bodies. In the lingo of their players, this meatspace is called RL, for “real life.” 
From the perspective of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Platonism, however, the meatspace 
is not our real life. It is a super-game, and our bodies are avatars. Into the game we 
descend, adopting our avatars in order to seek wisdom and ultimately an escape from 
embodiment altogether. Calling our meatspace reality, then, would presuppose these 
religions and philosophies to be wrong. Let us begin by suspending judgment about 
them and explore the analogy between them and online gaming. These new 
technologies may allow us to experience afresh the ethical outlook of these ancient 
traditions. But they may also help us to dust off some of their best arguments. 
For those unfamiliar with online gaming, how does it work? Turkle’s book is twenty 
years old now, and the games she discusses, like the computers on which they ran, are 
all gone. Yet the potent engagement of imagination and emotion remains the same. 
Unlike video games—most famously, Super Mario Bros. or Pac-Man—where players try 
to overcome obstacles scripted by the games’ designers, online role-playing games are 
virtual worlds in which there are no scripts, except those improvised by the players 
together. They are played simultaneously by many people (sometimes hundreds of 
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thousands) whose avatars interact in a virtual world. The most popular at the moment 
of writing seems to be an installment of the Final Fantasy franchise (XIV) which boasts 
over two million registered players, a quarter of whom log-on each day. The most well-
known to people outside this sub-culture has probably been Second Life, where there 
are no universal obstacles or goals; each player decides for herself what the game is 
about. She creates and manipulates an image of herself, anonymously, often with great 
freedom. The common purpose of all players, then, is to appear as they wish, without 
the constraints imposed by the meatspace (notably the physical constraints of their 
own bodies, but just as importantly the moral constraints of their own cultures).  
Why do millions of people around the world play these games, sometimes to the 
exclusion of all but the necessities of their embodied lives? More particularly, why—
from the infinite variety of avatars available in many of them—do they create the 
avatars that they do, manipulating them some ways rather than others? It’s a world of 
appearances, so perhaps the answer is obvious: the fulfillment of wishes and fantasies. 
But all these appearances must to some extent be a reflection of the meatspace where 
the wishes and fantasies were conceived, otherwise their fulfillment would be hollow. 
“For virtual reality to be interesting it has to emulate the real,” says one of the players 
Turkle interviewed, “but you have to be able to do something in the virtual that you 
couldn’t do in the real.”8 Let’s therefore put our question this way: how do the contours 
of someone’s meatspace contribute to the appearances he crafts in his cyberspace?  
Among Turkle’s most interesting anecdotes are those of gender-swapping. But this 
does not require a computer. Shakespeare dramatizes its benefits in As You Like It, 
where characters cross-dress and find that through their deception they can more 
easily find the truth about themselves. Masks and role-playing games have always 
offered players this low-tech route to self-knowledge. Turkle recounts the story of 
Julee, a college student whose Catholic mother disowned her when she had an abortion. 
In a role-playing game of political intrigue soon afterward, Julee played a member of a 
spy-ring, a mother whose daughter was part of the same ring. The script of the game 
eventually revealed the daughter to be a counter-spy, destined to kill her mother unless 
she were punished with death herself. Julee’s character refused to execute the 
punishment, instead engaging her daughter in hours of tearful, spontaneous 
conversation that Julee experienced as therapeutic. By playing the mother, and 
rewriting the script both of the game and of her own adolescence, “Julee was able to 




So cyberspace does not introduce a new possibility, as technological utopians 
would have it, but it does intensify one that has always existed. Some players feel 
emboldened to enact violent fantasies with impunity. Others play altruistic roles that, 
for whatever reason, they find themselves unable to realize in the meatspace. Nearly 
every role that exists here exists there, in addition to others that exist only in our 
dreams. Some avatars are chaste, others are promiscuous, and many sell cybersex. 
Taking the currencies of cybergames to exchanges in real life (secure websites with 
links to credit-card companies), cyber sex-workers can earn enough to support 
themselves in RL. Indeed, there are hundreds of ways to make money in these games, 
so that virtual economies have developed, as have laws and judicial systems, politics 
and education, masters and slaves. Hearts are broken, fortunes are made, and it all 
happens very fast. Online games intensify the effects of traditional role-playing in two 
crucial ways: first, an infinite range of avatars and actions fosters more anonymity and 
freedom; second, these games can be played continuously for years, giving them a 
legitimate claim to be alternate worlds. Sometimes second lives, sometimes third or 
fourth.  
In these alternate worlds, the adult can rediscover the imaginative scenarios of 
children’s play, with all the emotional risks and moral complications of the schoolyard, 
but without the prohibitive cost of the only other activity where he can sustain that 
experience over years: psychoanalysis. To the players of the online games Turkle 
investigated twenty years ago, “what happened was consistent with what the 
psychoanalytic tradition calls ‘working through.’”10 And the same is true nowadays. But 
what is that? The term first occurs in “Remembering, Repeating, and Working 
Through,” which Jonathan Lear calls “the most significant article Freud wrote.”11 In it 
he distinguishes between repeating a destructive pattern of thinking or behavior, 
remembering the events that caused the repetition, and ‘working through’ it. Repeating 
is the reason people go into analysis in the first place; remembering is the Hollywood 
version of analytic cure: the epiphany on the couch that banishes all demons. But this 
is a fantasy of analysis; memory is insufficient, as Freud himself recognized. ‘Working 
through’ is required, although it is far from clear what this involves. 
  
2. Objects 
“The shadow of the object fell upon the ego.”12 With this vatic sentence—hidden in the 
middle of “Mourning and Melancholia,” another important little essay by Freud—he set 
psychoanalysis on a new theoretical course. The name that would eventually be given 
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to this new course (“object-relations”) stems from Freud’s early distinction between 
the object and aim of a desire. If the lips, for example, are the object of someone’s 
desire, kissing them could be one of his aims, so too could biting, or touching, or 
looking. Sometimes the objects of our desires are body parts, other times they are 
whole people. For fetishists, moreover, they may not be people at all, but instead 
inanimate objects. “Object” is a useful bit of jargon because of this ambiguity, as well 
as another. We relate to the objects of our desire in the external world, right from the 
moment we are born, but once these relations become habitual, and we begin to 
represent them to ourselves within our own imaginations, we then relate to inner 
objects as well—namely, images or representations. An “object” can thus be a part of 
another person, that person’s whole, or no person at all; likewise, it can be external or 
internal.   
Freud thought depression could be understood as a toxic relation with one of these 
inner objects. When a lover is frustrated in her love, whether by the death of her 
beloved or disappointment with him, she most usually withdraws her desire for this 
object over time, slowly learning how to live without him, and gradually displacing it 
onto another. This is mourning. But sometimes, according to Freud, the desire for the 
original object stubbornly persists. The lover cannot let go. Rather than withdrawing 
and displacing that desire onto someone else, she keeps the beloved alive in 
unconscious fantasy, effecting “an identification of the ego with the abandoned 
object.”13 In short, the beloved becomes a part of her. Whatever feelings she had for the 
original object, she now experiences toward herself. When hate as well as love 
characterized her original relation (an ambivalence Freud sees in nearly every human 
affection), she will feel the self-loathing so characteristic of the depressed, above all 
when a guilty conscience tricks her into feeling responsible for the abandonment. 
Melancholia, in short, is failed mourning.  
Whether or not Freud was right about depression, he tendered a plausible 
explanation of how we become who we are. For as we grow, love, and grieve, the 
shadows of our objects fall upon our egos. Your self is a graveyard: everyone you have 
ever loved is buried there. A century has passed since Freud first advanced this idea; 
naturally, it has become more sophisticated in subsequent psychology. Its most well-
known advocates have been Melanie Klein and D. W. Winnicott, but the best version is 
that of Otto Kernberg, who has synthesized it with other strands of Freud’s thought—
especially the drives—with which it was formerly considered opposed. Rather than 




whole relationship with them. We create an internal representation of the object, yes, 
but also a “self-representation interacting with an object representation under the 
dominance of a certain affect.”14 Together these three—representations of the two 
people or parts involved in the relationship, suffused with the emotions characteristic 
of it—comprise the object-relation. 
For example, anger and guilt often characterize the relationship between a father 
and his toddling son. The son deliberately breaks the rules in order to experiment with 
his new independence and to test the resolve of his father to enforce them. Thus 
challenged, the father often grows angry and the son usually shows guilt, but 
sometimes the father feels guilty that his anger got too hot, while the son gets angry 
that the assertion of his will failed to achieve its goal. In Kernberg’s theory, this tangle 
of representations and emotions will be internalized by the toddler as one whole 
object-relation. Later, when he has matured into an adult, perhaps even a father, he 
will re-enact this object-relation. He may seem to grow angry at his children, but in fact 
his anger is a re-enactment of his father’s ancient anger at him, or perhaps his own 
ancient anger toward his father. In any case, when his aggression appears 
disproportionate to the present, these manifestations of his early relationship now in 
his adult life will be easily misunderstood as evidence for an aggressive drive—
something innate, impersonal, pushing for discharge. From the perspective of object-
relations theory, this is the common misunderstanding of pure drive psychology, 
whether it’s found in Nietzsche, Freud, or their successors. According to Kernberg, the 
earlier object-relation explains the aggression rather than the other way round. 
But the internalization of aggression, excitement, and the relationships they 
suffuse goes back further than our toddling, back to the first days of our infancy. After 
birth, when newborns cannot conceive of a whole person, neither another nor 
themselves, their representations of both will be partial. Thus, when feeding goes 
smoothly, a baby will internalize an image of something like its mother’s breast, 
something like its own mouth, and an intense feeling of satisfaction. Or, if something 
goes wrong with feeding, it may instead suffuse the same images with the acute pain of 
infant hunger. If these infantile object-relations resurface in adult life, so too will 
everything associated with them: thinking will become chaotic, and passion extreme, 
as is typical of an infant—or someone making love. Earthquakes often destroy the 
architecture of the present, but sometimes they also bring archaic ruins to light.  
Our adult minds are collections of such internal object-relations—some in 
harmony, many in conflict. In short, we contain multitudes: layers of these relations, 
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some shifting according to the vicissitudes of our lives, most remaining buried by our 
perpetual efforts to seem all grown-up while avoiding searing pain. After all, 
relationships of childhood no less than adulthood are fraught with emotions such as 
shame, guilt, fear, and sadness; to diminish their pain, when we internalize these 
relationships, we layer them over with others that feel better. Recall Julee, who could 
not access the object-relation that characterized her adolescence without playing a 
game. According to Kernberg’s theory, she developed a sense of herself by internalizing 
this relation, a conjunction of two images (herself and her mother), but also the 
particular emotions that characterized them (maybe anger and guilt). The game gave 
her an opportunity to enact this object-relation, and to some extent update its script, 
something not so easily done in everyday life without serious consequences. Imagine a 
life of repeated betrayal—a doomed, unconscious effort to rewrite that script—and you 
see why Freud favored Heraclitus’s aphorism: “character is destiny.”15 
Notice that if object-relations theory is correct, it would not have mattered whether 
she played the mother or the child, the traitor or the betrayed, the angry judge or the 
guilty criminal, so long as the relation itself was activated. Moreover, with that object-
relation helping to constitute her self, when the role-playing game gave her license to 
play her mother’s role, it allowed her to be (a part of) herself. She could feel what 
otherwise she might have been unable to feel, and recognize these feelings as her own. 
In other words, she could integrate both these feelings and the whole object-relation 
which they suffuse into a more accurate sense of herself. Finally, she could adapt her 
script—improvising according to present circumstances, rather than repeating lines 
more suited to another time and place. This is working-through: a vivid experience of 
one’s inner object-relations, a recognition of them as constitutive of oneself, and 
finally an adaptation of them as well as one’s self-image. It’s a technical term for 
growing-up. Children begin this work alone when they play with dolls or speak with 
imaginary friends, and they continue it together in their schoolyard games. In his ideal 
education, Plato insisted on the superiority of play over compulsion.16 In his account of 
becoming himself, Nietzsche said “I know of no other way of dealing with great tasks 
than that of play.”17  
A hint of the great task of maturity is available in a brief role-playing game, such as 
Julee experienced, but the revelations of intense moments seldom effect real change in 
the structure of a self assembled from the object-relations of childhood. Revising the 
script of a human life is not the work of a weekend. What is required, at the very least, 




for many months or even years. This is what cybergames make possible. “Players 
sometimes talk about their real selves as a composite of their characters,” writes 
Turkle, “and sometimes talk about their screen personae as means for working on their 
RL lives.”18 It is not unusual that one player will create several avatars. The variations 
may be infinite and idiosyncratic, but they are far from random. Each is externalizing 
inner object-relations, transferring them to the playground of the game.  
A woman playing a man may be working through the gender roles inherited from 
her family, which have constituted but inhibited her in RL. Adopting the man’s role in 
this script, she can rewrite it from within, integrating it and the assertive advantages it 
now offers into her self-image. A man playing a woman may be experiencing for the 
first time in decades a part of himself—his childhood relationship with his sister—that 
he lost access to when she died tragically. He buried this object-relation deep within 
himself because of the sadness that came to suffuse it. Thanks to the hard work of play 
online, he exhumes her by becoming her, thereby recognizing more of his graveyard as 
his own. As an adult, he can understand her death in a way he could not as a child, so 
now he rearranges the graveyard according to the needs of his present rather than 
those of his immature past.  
Some can accomplish this rearrangement in solo fantasy, reminiscence, and 
narrative writing. With great luck or discipline, it is possible to return to one’s 
childhood. Thanks to the taste of an infused madeleine, for instance, Proust’s narrator 
recovered a moment of lost time, complete with its emotions as well as its sensations. 
But it took him years of disciplined writing to reclaim much of the rest. Even then, his 
memories alone were insufficient to give meaning to his adult life. He had to edit, 
arrange, and synthesize these memories to produce the great novel that would achieve 
that feat. When lesser mortals remember, we do so down familiar paths, well-lit and 
supervised by our present preoccupations. Some of our memories approximate 
authenticity, but many are confabulated, and most lack the vitality of feeling. Stock 
images accompanied by stereotyped passions decorate memory lane. Repetition 
characterizes our trips down it as well as our behaviors in RL: we find ourselves re-
enacting the same object-relations with other people; when we introspect, in order to 
understand why this is so, we typically recall only what that script deems relevant; 
when we nonetheless bring truths about ourselves to light, the uses to which we put 
them are almost always familiar. Solo therapy is all but doomed by our psychological 
inertia. 
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The intervention of other people, however, can disrupt it. They have their own 
scripts and will never fully permit you to re-enact yours. Indeed, someone will 
cooperate in your re-enactment at all only if you have a role that approximates one of 
his. Your two scripts must overlap enough to trick you both into believing there is no 
script at all. Only so can you both play it with feeling. This is as true of the schoolyard 
as it is of virtual worlds. Your childhood friends are the ones who like to play the same 
games as you do; so likewise are your adult friends. Lovers marry when their scripts 
seem to overlap, and they divorce when they discover too wide a divergence. It’s the 
same in a cybergame as in RL, only online everything happens faster. It’s easier to 
believe that your script overlaps with another’s, that someone is your dream come true, 
when there is so little of the physical and moral resistance that slows things down in 
the meatspace. The enhanced freedom and anonymity of cyberspace, by contrast, bring 
buried object-relations quickly to the surface. With them come their associated 
passions, sometimes hot.  
Anyone skeptical that sexual satisfaction can be found online—while disembodied, 
so to speak—should consider the phenomenon of the wet dream, which has always 
testified that imagination alone is sufficient for sexual excitement. And so, for 
example, a dominant lesbian enters Red Light Center to achieve the satisfaction she 
cannot find in the conservative culture surrounding her isolated farm. She creates an 
avatar with this description, and she wanders its clubs and bars until she finds another 
woman looking to submit. Their avatars couple as they co-write the script of a fantasy. 
She may never know who the other player really is, and it may not matter. For a time, 
she enjoys playing her role, and the other player—for whatever reason—enjoys the 
complementary one. But let us imagine that she becomes curious about that other role 
and creates a second avatar, a submissive lesbian, permitting her to enact the obverse 
role of the object-relation which elicits her most intense passions. Maybe she abandons 
the first avatar and has the new one assume both roles, becoming a switch. Or maybe 
she keeps her online roles separate, reserving their combination for her rare sexual 
opportunities in the meatspace. In either case, she is on the way to integrating the 
fullness of that object relation into her self-image. She is coming to know herself, in 
sum, and thereby refashioning herself. But what is that—her self? 
 
3. Selves 
“As for the I,” wrote Nietzsche in one of his last books, “it has become a fable, a fiction, 




instead a tangle of moods and emotions. He inaugurates the observation in one of his 
first essays, On Moods, written when he was only twenty years old: “When I eavesdrop 
on my own thoughts and feelings and silently attend to myself, it is as if I heard the 
hum and buzzing of those wild factions.”20 But at this stage he still speaks of an “I,” 
observing, a “myself,” observed. With the publication of Birth of Tragedy eight years 
later, however, he begins criticizing the principle of individuation, which produces the 
appearance of distinct selves. It is merely an Apollonian veil that hides the Dionysian 
reality of undifferentiated unity.21  
Nietzsche sustains this critique of selfhood through most of his subsequent books. 
In Daybreak, for example, the ego is only “so-called.”22 In its place are “anger, hatred, 
love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain,” which are themselves but “names for extreme 
states: the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are 
continually in play elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and 
destiny.” Here an introspection that reveals only separate components is conjoined 
with a doctrine that introspection is limited, that it reveals only the mountain peaks of 
a varied mental landscape. As for the self, or rather the illusion of it, this is a product of 
language and habit. By saying ‘I,’ by repeatedly imputing a unity to the internal 
cacophony, we bestow a specious substance on this illusion. “Our opinion of ourself,” 
our self-image, “is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our character and 
destiny.”23 With these views, Nietzsche seems to have anticipated the conclusion of 
object-relations theory about selfhood. For neither are you one thing if your self is 
nothing but a collection of internalized object-relations.  
Turkle endorses this conclusion in the more radical version she attributes to 
Jacques Lacan and other French philosophers of his era: the self is fragmented, its unity 
an illusion. Although she studied in post-1968 Paris, it wasn’t until she played roles 
online, “where Gallic abstractions are concrete,” that she finally understood their 
point: “what we experience as the ‘I’ can be likened to something we create with smoke 
and mirrors.” Online gamers may know nothing of French philosophy, but they 
assimilate this vertiginous insight whenever they play multiple avatars. In cyberspace 
we easily distinguish between a self (at the keyboard) and a self-image (the avatar). But 
if this French chorus is correct, then so too in the meatspace must we draw the same 
distinction: self, a collection of fragments; self-image, a stubborn illusion of unity. But 
what produces this illusion, and why is it so stubborn? 
Object-relations theory answers these questions neatly. The fragments are inner 
object-relations, as we have seen, together comprising the self; but when one object-
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relation prevails over all the others, its self-reflection becomes the whole self’s image 
of itself. Typically, though, this self-image misrepresents the whole self. This illusion 
persists so long as this object-relation prevails—which is to say, so long as the self 
retains its structure, so long as the repressed emotions remain too painful to bear. But 
even when the structure changes, and a new object-relation prevails, the old illusion 
will simply be replaced by another. The details of our illusions may change (“I was a 
victim but now I’m empowered,” “I was a sinner but now I’m saved,” “I was sexy but 
now I’m disgusting” or whatever), but their substratum remains the same (“I am I: one, 
real, substantial”). No wonder that the Apollonian imperative of the oracle at Delphi is 
so difficult to follow.24 Indeed, as Nietzsche observed, “the maxim ‘know thyself!’ 
addressed to human beings by a god is almost malicious.”25 
You might feel proud, for instance, because pride is one of the emotions that 
characterize the object-relation—between you and your father—that has prevailed over 
the others in your self. Although this emotion feels crucial to your happiness, it is 
really an echo of the contempt he felt for you when he returned home from the bar and 
beat you. Whenever you feel this pride, then, you are playing his role, and thus need 
someone else to play the ashamed and fearful child. Your wife? Your own children? 
Your subordinates at work? Your life becomes a series of frustrating relationships in 
which your illusion of happiness requires the denigration and intimidation of others. 
And this illusion requires another, a self-image, which ignores what’s really happening 
here. By contrast, achieving self-knowledge—whether through psychoanalysis, an 
online game, or some other means—will require working-through: courageously 
recognizing, reclaiming, and revising alienated fragments of your self, beginning with 
the searing shame and chilling fear of your childhood. 
Yet something essential is missing from this account of selfhood, as the following 
three sets of questions aim to make clear. First of all, some of our relationships are 
internalized, while others leave no trace. According to this account, we internalize a 
relation when its object is something, or someone, we desire. But which objects do we 
desire? And why? Secondly, of all the object-relations we internalize, some 
predominate, scripting our engagement with others and determining our image of our 
self, while others sink into the depths, escaping our awareness. Why? By what criterion 
do we arrange the object-relations that comprise our self? Third, and above all, who is 
this ‘we’? It cannot be our self, let alone our self-image, for this mysterious agent 




These are difficult and abstract questions. We can pose them more concretely 
through the graveyard simile. If our selves are like graveyards, there must be a sexton. 
He accepts some bodies for burial, but rejects others; he allocates plots, deciding to 
bury this body here, that body there; he permits this one to receive a headstone, that 
one a mausoleum. Only so does the graveyard become a graveyard, properly speaking, 
rather than a landfill of rotting corpses. Nietzsche elaborated a similar metaphor: “One 
can dispose of one’s drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots 
of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on 
a trellis.”26 Some prefer a garden in the French fashion, others in the Chinese, and so 
on. But it is also possible “to let the plants grow up and fight their fight out among 
themselves—indeed, one can take delight in such a wilderness, and desire precisely this 
delight, though it gives one some trouble, too.” We can garden well or badly, but how 
we do so is up to us. “All this we are at liberty to do,” Nietzsche adds. But who is this 
free gardener within us? What guides his decisions? To what end does he exercise his 
freedom? 
Let us try to answer these difficult and abstract questions by returning to the 
experience of online gamers. Those who become addicted begin to feel that their 
virtual lives are at least as real as their embodied ones, sometimes more so. “RL is just 
one more window,” says one such player, “and it’s not usually my best one.”27 This is a 
radical ontology—that our embodied life is just one more window, a game no more real 
than those online—which seems at first to complement the fragmentary psychology 
shared by philosophical psychoanalysts from Freud to Kernberg, Nietzsche to Lacan. A 
unitary self for human bodies, according to them all, is a misleading appearance, an 
illusion—like an avatar. The lives of avatars, furthermore, are like the lives of bodies 
inasmuch as all are dramas scripted by fundamental object-relations. It wouldn’t 
matter what sort of world (virtual or physical) serves as the stage for the enactment of 
these dramas, if the radical ontology—whether of the ancient Sophists or the recent 
postmodernists—were correct and there is no ultimate reality, or meta-narrative, only 
narratives and perceptions without end. 
If bodies are more real than online avatars, however, it could be because they are 
playing roles in a special sort of game: RL. For not all games are created equal. 
Cyberspace depends on the existence of the meatspace, but not the other way round: 
obliterate cyberspace and the meatspace endures; obliterate the meatspace, and with it 
goes cyberspace. There is thus a hierarchy of reality. This argument undercuts the 
gamer’s testimony that RL is just another window, one game equal in reality to those 
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online, but it leaves untouched the idea that RL is nonetheless a game, a special one, a 
super-game. Indeed, this idea agrees neatly with the fragmentary psychology we have 
been exploring. When you sit your body before a keyboard to play cybergames, you are 
embedding roles within the super-roles you already play in the super-game called RL. 
Whether doing so permits you to work through the roles you play here, or entrenches 
them with mere repetition there, these are ultimately roles within roles, games within a 
game. But is it games and roles all the way down? This would be the consequence of the 
conjunction of our fragmentary psychology with any ontology according to which there 
is no basic reality, no ultimate self.  
It would also be incoherent, because there cannot be a game without a player. This 
is true of any sort of game, but consider only the online ones which suggest otherwise. 
Many avatars in these virtual worlds are “bots,” lively features of the virtual 
environment, some more sophisticated than others. All of them, however, are 
determined by the same computer program that creates the environment. Walk your 
own avatar into a shop, for example, and a bot may offer a canned greeting and begin a 
tour. Bots perform all kinds of functions in these games, but there could be no game 
populated entirely by them. As interesting and meaningful as this experiment could 
be—as a social simulation, for instance, run by economists—it would not be a game. For 
there would be no players, no one making choices. Whatever significance it had would 
have to be imposed from outside it (by the economists); no one within it would be able 
to grant anything meaning or value. If the postmodern use of fragmentary psychology 
were correct, then, RL could not be a super-game, or a game of any sort; it would be 
populated entirely by the bodily equivalent of bots: object-relations.  
To deny that RL is populated entirely by bodily bots, to assert that some who appear 
in the meatspace are agents, capable of free choice, we must find something within 
ourselves that makes us who we are—the lover of our objects, the architect of their 
inner relations, the sexton of our selves. Our discussion of online games could help us 
locate this mysterious agent, for if the meatspace is a super-game, we should expect 
this agent to play the roles of embodied life for the same reasons a gamer plays the 
roles of her avatars. We concluded earlier that she does this for two reasons: first, to 
know herself better, by recognizing alienated parts of herself and adapting her self-
image to her whole self; and second, to make this whole self better, by revising the 
scripts of its object-relations according to her present circumstances. When she plays 
roles in her embodied life, accordingly, we might expect her to be seeking the same 




order both to know herself better and to create the best possible version of her self. If 




Before he proposed the image of the gardener, Nietzsche had a grander theory of who 
we are. “The secret ground of our essence” he supposed to be a world will, “whose 
phenomenal appearance we are.”29 Nietzsche borrowed this theory from Schopenhauer, 
who introduced elements of Indian philosophy into the German tradition by fusing 
them with Kant.30 Behind the phenomenal veil of Maya, according to Schopenhauer, 
was the noumenal Will of the world.31 “I feel myself compelled,” Nietzsche agreed, “to 
make the metaphysical assumption that that which truly exists and the original Unity, 
with its eternal suffering and contradiction, needs at the same time the delightful 
vision, the pleasurable appearance, for its continual redemption.”32 In Nietzsche’s 
version, then, the experiences of our senses, including the experiences of ourselves as 
separate individuals, are pleasant illusions projected by the original Unity for its 
continual redemption. “For only as an aesthetic phenomenon,” famously, “are 
existence and the world justified to eternity.”33  
The world is thus a stage, according to Birth of Tragedy, and we are merely players. 
More precisely, the world Will makes a stage upon which it then plays. “This ‘self’ is 
not the same as that of the empirically real waking man,” Nietzsche writes, echoing the 
Upanishads, “but rather the only I which truly exists, the eternal I.”34 What about us? 
We are merely the characters this Self invents for its own aesthetic pleasure: “our 
innermost being, the substratum common to us all, experiences the dream with 
profound pleasure.”35 So we are its dream-images, avatars of the eternal Self. “This is a 
dream,” he imagines it saying to itself, “I want to dream on!”36 This is not to say we are 
altogether inert. Just as Hamlet, Shakespeare’s character, can stage a play within his 
play, so too can we artfully re-present the appearances of our empirical lives.37 Our 
dreams are such representations—nocturnal re-appearances of the appearances from 
our daily lives. They can be beautiful, but the most beautiful of our representations, in 
Nietzsche’s estimation, are our works of art. Greatest of these were the Attic tragedies, 
especially those of Aeschylus, but every artwork earns his approval if it represents the 
terrible truth that we are only avatars, created and destroyed for no purpose other than 
the joy of our one Will.  
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This substratum is the real artist, creator both of us and of whatever we create, just 
as Shakespeare is the real dramaturge, writer both of Hamlet and of whatever its 
characters stage within it. Let us pause for a moment and dwell on this comparison, 
which clarifies several important but subtle points about drama and the distinction 
between appearance and reality. Within the virtual world of Hamlet, Hamlet is an agent 
capable of creating a subordinate virtual world, complete with characters of his own 
choice, who speak lines of his choosing, in the way he advises. And he does this. King 
Claudius does not know this, so Hamlet does not appear to him to be the director of the 
play. He is wrong. To Horatio, by contrast, Hamlet does appear to be the director of the 
play. He is right. Within the virtual world created by Shakespeare, then, Hamlet really is 
the director of the play. But in the world inhabited by Shakespeare, our empirical world, 
Hamlet only appears to be that director. After all, Shakespeare writes those lines; he is 
the real dramaturge. The play within the play would not even exist were it not for him, 
nor would Hamlet. There is in drama, as with cybergames, a hierarchy of reality. 
Nietzsche’s dramaturgical view of the world and ourselves in Birth of Tragedy 
accordingly construes RL—“real life” to online gamers, “empirical reality” to 
philosophers—as a super-game. Speaking without qualification, your reading this paper 
is an illusion, as was my writing it. In fact, the super-gamer is reading now a paper it 
wrote earlier, for whatever reason. But when we add a qualification, making it clear that 
we are considering the empirical level of the cosmic drama, it’s not an illusion at all, 
but really happening: you are really reading this, just as I really wrote it, and anyone 
who thinks otherwise is wrong. After all, the world of Shakespeare’s play is virtual, but 
in it the King and Queen of Denmark are really watching a play that is really directed by 
Hamlet, whatever they think. He had his purpose for doing so: catching the conscience 
of a King. So too, when you dream or write plays, you create avatars for your own 
purposes. However, beneath you—you and Hamlet, not to mention Shakespeare too—is 
the creator and player of a super-game in which all of us (as we typically think of 
ourselves, anyway) are merely avatars. Downstream from the Brahman of Indian 
philosophy, Nietzsche’s dramaturge is who we really are: sexton, gardener or artist; one 
Will, cosmic dreamer, or eternal I.   
He preserved these conclusions about drama and dream even after he abandoned 
the dualistic metaphysics of Schopenhauer. “I must go on dreaming lest I perish,” he 
repeats in Gay Science, for example, where appearance is no longer “the opposite of 
some essence.”38 The real world has become a fable, as Nietzsche will later write, so 




certain kinds of appearance.39 Playing his role in a new sort of drama, nonetheless, he 
“belongs to the masters of ceremony of existence.” Masters: plural. Gone is the one 
dramaturge, the original Unity, the eternal Self inherited from Indian philosophy. In its 
place are manifold new artists: the bodily drives, the infinite and perhaps purposeless 
strivings of a material world.40 This is as evident in the passages on the notorious will-
to-power as it is in his new understanding of the human self. Is it still capable of 
accounting for dramaturgy? In other words, is it capable of accounting for the special 
power of the gardener within, who cultivates some of our drives while weeding out 
others, all in order to live a better life—however that be understood?41  
 
5. Commanders 
“‘Body am I and soul’ – so speaks the child,” as though memorizing a catechism of 
Platonic origin.42 Nietzsche’s Zarathustra encourages us to put aside our childish ways 
and awake from the nightmare of ascetic history: “the awakened, the knowing one says: 
body am I through and through, and nothing besides.” As for soul, it “is just a word for 
something on the body.” Without soul, however, it is not clear what remains of us. The 
body is not one thing, after all, but a multiplicity, and Nietzsche never loses sight of 
this fact. It’s “a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.” The war and the herd are 
easy enough to discern in his writing, but what about this peace, and who is the 
shepherd? Formerly, according to Platonism, these were the immaterial soul and the 
fruit of its mastery over the body. What are they now, for body awakened to its 
independence?  
The shepherd is not the ‘I,’ the ‘ego,’ or any notion that smacks of consciousness, 
because they all become subordinate to the body. They are its activities. “Your body 
and its great reason,” Zarathustra declares, “does not say I, but does I.” If there is any 
selfhood left in this account, then, it must stand behind our conscious activity. “Behind 
your thoughts and feelings,” then, “stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise 
man—he is called self.” In case there is any lingering doubt about his composition, 
Zarathustra adds, “he is your body.” But how can a body, a multiplicity of drives, be its 
own commander? By the action of its great reason, Nietzsche answers, and this seems 
to be its supreme drive, the one powerful enough to arrange the body’s other drives. 
This is the self. Its arrangement, in turn, determines what pains or pleases you: “The 
self says to the ego: ‘Feel pain here!’ And then it suffers and reflects on how it might 
suffer no more.” Likewise for pleasure.  
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When your supreme drive remains unconscious, you feel that you are being pushed 
or pulled by a foreign power. But that is only because you mistakenly think of yourself 
as consciousness, rather than as this commanding self. When your supreme drive 
becomes conscious, however, you feel a power that you could easily mistake for 
freedom. “Freedom of the will,” Nietzsche writes later in Beyond Good and Evil, “that is 
the word for that complex pleasurable condition experienced by the person willing who 
commands and simultaneously identifies himself with the one who executes the 
command.”43 Your body may be a teeming garden, but one plant comes eventually to 
dominate the others; it is the gardener. This is the wild garden Nietzsche envisioned 
earlier, the one that “gives one some trouble, too.” Yet can a plant garden—not just 
other plants, but itself? Can a drive command—not just other drives, but itself? “The 
one who cannot obey himself,” after all, “is commanded.”44  
A military analogy makes Nietzsche’s point quite clear. The captain gives orders, 
and thus commands, but his orders can be remanded by the major, whom he must obey. 
The major’s orders too, can be remanded by the colonel, whom he must obey. And so 
on up the chain of command until we reach the supreme commander. Her orders alone 
cannot be remanded; there is no higher authority whom she must obey; for she 
commands herself. But is self-command possible for a drive? Nietzsche’s notion of 
drive (or will) is far from clear, but one of the following two varieties is most commonly 
assumed: force or matter. Understood as a force, first of all, it is difficult to see how a 
drive could command itself. Self-command is a type of self-reflection, after all, a 
turning back upon the self. If a force were somehow able to turn back upon itself, 
though, it would cancel itself out. Self-reflection for a force would thus be tantamount 
to self-annihilation.  
Self-reflection—and thus another of its types, self-knowledge—is also impossible 
for matter, as Sextus Empiricus argued against the Epicureans and Stoics, his 
materialist opponents.45 It requires the self to play simultaneously two roles: subject 
and object of reflection. For a chunk of matter to play two roles, though, it must be 
divided into two parts: a part that is doing the reflecting, the subject, and a part that is 
being reflected upon, the object. If the subject and object of reflection are different, 
however, this will not be a case of self-reflection. If they are the same, no division 
occurred, and there could be no self-reflection. The paradox goes back to Plato, who 
poses it differently in different dialogues. In Republic, ‘self-command’ seems 
impossible.
 
“The stronger self that does the commanding,” Socrates observes, “is the 




all such expressions.”46 We cannot be both weaker and stronger than ourselves, can we? 
In Charmides, self-knowledge seems impossible, for similar reasons.47 Yet this is a goal, 
if not the goal, of Platonic philosophy! “What we need,” Socrates thus begs, “is some 
great man to give an adequate interpretation of this point in every detail, whether no 
existing thing can by nature apply its own faculty to itself but only towards something 
else, or whether some can, but others cannot.”48 
 
6. Knowers 
Plato seems to be that great man, beginning to resolve this problem by dividing us into 
parts. In Alcibiades, Socrates makes the simplest distinction, between body and soul.  A 
human being commands his body, and the commander must be different from the 
commanded, so the human being cannot be his body.49 Instead, he is the only other 
alternative—the soul.50 Even if there is a soul, however, the problem of self-command 
recurs. What commands the soul? Fortunately, Socrates warns that his simple 
argument lacks rigor. It’s enough to convince Alcibiades, who is eager to become 
supreme commander of the Athenians before he has learned to command himself. He 
needs to learn, first, who that self is; in other words, he needs to acquire self-
knowledge. If he learns that he is a soul, however, he cannot be supreme commander 
unless the soul that he is can somehow reflect upon itself. This is what the psychology 
of other Platonic dialogues permits. 
“To anyone who cannot see what is inside, but sees only the outer shell,” writes 
Plato in Republic, “it will look like a single creature, a human being.”51 We are deceived, 
he thinks, by the uniform appearance of our outer shell, our skin. But looking beneath 
it—which is to say practicing psychology, psychê-logos, or the study of the soul—he sees 
a multitude. Colorfully, he compares our souls to “one of those ancient creatures that 
legends say used to exist,” namely, “the Chimaera, Scylla, Cerberus, and the numerous 
other cases where many different kinds are said to have grown together into one.”52 
Plato also compares our inner fragmentation to a zoo, where a many-headed beast 
represents our unruly bodily appetites and a lion represents our emotions (or at least 
our longing for social status and our anger whenever this longing is frustrated). Had he 
stopped there, he would simply have anticipated the problem considered by Nietzsche. 
Like him, Plato sees the need for a sexton, a gardener, a commander—in this image, a 
zookeeper. To manage the many-headed beast and the lion, then, he installs a little 
human being. The task of this homunculus is to tame our beasts, directing their 
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energies toward the best possible life. This is the difficult task of ethics, but it requires 
knowing the best objects of desire and arranging our embodied life to achieve them.  
According to Plato, this knower and arranger is reason: the homunculus within the 
human being, the real self within the embodied self. But to perform its tasks—
knowledge, self-knowledge, and self-government towards true goodness—it must be 
able to accomplish what the bodily commander could not: self-reflection. His argument 
that it can occurs across several dialogues, drawing our attention to a remarkable 
feature of knowledge that distinguishes it from belief, true belief, and even true belief 
with an account.53 Let us try to compress it into an example. A student claims to know 
the Pythagorean theorem. She says that the square of the hypotenuse is the sum of the 
squares of the other two sides, and she shows that she is able to calculate it for any 
triangle she is given. But that is not knowledge of the theorem. It may simply be the 
repetition of a formula she was commanded to use at school, the way a soldier repeats 
his orders and then puts them into effect. Her teachers may know the theorem, 
properly speaking, and they may tell her about it, but she does not know whether they 
are right, any more than the soldier knows whether his orders are good. He may believe 
they are, and he may be right; she may trust her teachers, and her trust may be well-
placed; but true belief and prudent trust are not knowledge.  
Knowledge requires a more intimate relationship between its subject and object—in 
this case, the student and the Pythagorean theorem. There cannot be the sort of gap 
introduced, as here, by the authority of others. Indeed, there cannot even be the narrow 
gap introduced by the authority of an account. For if knowledge depended for its 
security on an account, and were therefore only as secure as this account, this account 
too would have to be known, requiring its own account, and an account of that account, 
setting us on an infinite regress. To be knowledge, then, the knowledge must authorize 
itself, and must therefore be knowledge of itself. If so, all knowledge is both self-
knowing and self-commanding. Echoing Delphic Apollo, whose inscriptions enjoined 
temple-goers to self-restraint as well as self-knowledge, Socrates reminds Alcibiades 
“we agreed that knowing oneself was the same as being self-commanded.”54 To perform 
these self-reflective functions, as we have seen, reason cannot be either force or 
matter; it must be immaterial. This is Plato’s view: although the embodied soul 
includes appetites and passions, its true nature, discernible only when it is 
disembodied, is purely rational.55 Only so can it function as the commander, the 




He compares the embodied soul to the sea-god Glaucus, an avatar whose radiant 
form has been dimmed and deformed by immersion in the waves. So too our reason, 
after descending into the meatspace, becomes “maimed by its partnership with the 
body.”56 When it is pure, however, it is not “full of multicolored variety and 
dissimilarity and conflict with itself.”57 The hint of its purity—our real self—is available 
from “its love of wisdom” (in Greek, its philosophia).58 Whoever we are, in other words, 
we are the ones asking who we are, what kind of world we really live in, and what we 
should do with ourselves in reality thus understood. Plato embedded his answers to 
these central questions in an allegory of a cave, which is susceptible of many correct 
and complementary interpretations.59 Among them is the following eschatological tale: 
after purifying itself of bodily attachments in order to recognize itself, reality, and the 
supreme value that suffuses both, the soul must nevertheless return to the darkness of 
embodiment, a virtual reality of mere images.60 But why? 
One motive might be philosophic—that is, the love of wisdom and the search for 
understanding. Nowadays, when we want to understand ourselves and our reality, with 
dozens of sciences investigating relevant questions, one lifetime is obviously 
insufficient to answer them all. “Life is short,” the Hippocratics knew, “but the art is 
long.”61 Even if it were long, though, the particularities of embodied life impose certain 
restrictions on our pursuit of knowledge. Is sex more pleasurable for a man or a 
woman? This is something the Greeks wanted to know, it seems, for one of their myths 
recounts a debate on this question between Zeus and Hera, each maintaining that the 
greater pleasure was available to the other. To resolve it, they turned to Tiresias, the 
legendary seer, for he had known the bodily experience of each gender. After seeing 
one pair of copulating snakes, he changed into a woman; he changed back into a man, 
later, when he saw another pair. Asked this pregnant question, Tiresias answered that 
the woman enjoys it more—for which Hera blinded his eyes but Zeus compensated him 
with the gift of prophecy.62 
Wisdom was also the goal of reincarnation for Plato, his Pythagorean predecessors, 
and the Indian philosophers whose original doctrine they transmitted to the Greeks. In 
an earlier version of this doctrine, a soul transmigrates haphazardly through different 
species, as well as different types of human existence, until it has seen the cosmos from 
the perspective of every sort of living being. Only so can it finally transcend the limits 
of these many perspectives and understand the one world as it really is. “There is no 
diversity,” reads the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, and “he gets death after death who 
perceives here seeming diversity.”63 Escape from these cycles of embodiment is the 
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final reward of someone who finally learns that “as a Unity only is It to be looked upon, 
this indemonstrable, enduring Being.”64 A later version moralizes the doctrine. Rather 
than transmigrating haphazardly, the soul ascends or descends a hierarchy of lives 
according to its merit (karma). The Chandogya Upanishad, for instance, promises rebirth 
to an upper-caste mother for good deeds; for bad, transmigration into “the womb of a 
dog, or the womb of a swine.”65  
The doctrine of reincarnation appears in Greek texts not long afterwards, but does 
so only in this moralized version.66 Empedocles, for instance, said that he had been a 
girl, a bush, a bird, and a fish, thus seeing the cosmos from the air and the water, from 
the perspective of an animal and a plant, not to mention a female as well as male.67 But 
his incarnations were not random: he ranked them, deeming the lion the best of 
animals, the laurel the best of plants, and the best of human roles the ones he himself 
occupied (poet, priest, physician, and politician).68 He had ascended through all these 
lives and now walked among humans, he wrote, “as an immortal god.”69  
Plato seems to have been humbler, yet he adopted the same moralized version of 
the doctrine.70 One may descend into a human body and nonetheless fail to learn 
anything valuable, choosing to see the appearances of the meatspace as originals rather 
than the images they really are. “Not to be moved abruptly from here to a vision of 
Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here,” such an agent plays the super-
game of the meatspace the way someone plays an online game, repetitively, for nothing 
more than amusement or immediate gratification: “he surrenders to pleasure and sets 
out in the manner of a four-footed beast.”71 Whether according to cosmic justice or his 
own postmortem choice, Plato suggests in Phaedo, he will be reincarnated as an 
animal.72 But an agent who manipulates her avatar—that is, her body—in order to know 
her world, to know her self, and to arrange a better life will ascend a ladder of 




In Phaedrus Plato also imagines the soul as a chariot, drawn by two horses—a more 
obedient one representing our emotions, an impetuous one representing our 
appetites—and conducted by a charioteer who represents our reason.74 This charioteer 
tries to direct our desire toward the higher reality of the Forms, and thus away from the 
debasing illusions to which we are naturally drawn by our embodiment (appetitive 




and status). Failing, after catching a glimpse of the divine procession, he falls below to 
another embodiment; succeeding, he remains above. “When they think in this way,” 
says Krishna, charioteer of Vishnu, “the insightful ones who are gifted with creative 
contemplation, are part of me.”75 Whether or not he did walk among the Greeks as an 
incarnate god, Empedocles’ ambition to divinity was not a betrayal of the tradition but 
instead its fulfillment.  
The truth of this untimely contemplative ethics depends, of course, on the truth of 
the many doctrines it presupposes, beginning with the unfashionable one that our 
agent within, our true self, is non-bodily, immaterial reason. Whatever we think of the 
arguments marshaled to support it—most of which could not be reproduced here—
something as valuable as conviction is nonetheless available to us now. For whether or 
not we subscribe to these ancient traditions, and whether or not we credit the 
arguments to be made in their favor, we can still experience their outlook by absorption 
in a cybergame. Religious experience, in other words, is available online. These games 
can train us to recognize that what we typically think of as the self, whether the lover’s 
or the beloved’s, is merely an image. This recognition is a denigration of the body, as is 
sometimes charged, only if these ancient traditions are wrong about selfhood. If you 
hold a picture of your beloved, after all, you honor him and it by recognizing them each 
for what they are. There is a world of difference between caressing an image and 
caressing its original. True love demands that we acknowledge this difference. 
If these ancient traditions are right, true love also requires you to treat “real life,” 
the meatspace, as a virtual world, into which you have descended. This time you have 
assumed one sort of body, but next time it may be another—maybe of a different 
gender, class, or race; maybe of a different ability, sexuality, or even species—and so on 
with others, until the purpose of living has been achieved. Hearts will be broken, 
fortunes made, and it all happens over eons. But to what end? From the perspective of 
an avatar—in the cosmic super-game with which we are concluding, no less than in the 
role-playing games from which we began—the purpose of life will be to achieve 
knowledge of self and reality, to reorient our desire toward the most satisfying object. 
For Platonism, as we have seen, this is the Good; for Hinduism, Vishnu. Yet this answer 
to our initial question only brings us to the porch of a more imposing one: why does 
divinity itself descend? Why does it create? Why not remain within its own perfect 
solitude?  
We must remain standing on this porch. Although there are hints of an answer in 
Plato, Platonists have followed these hints into metaphysical labyrinths, often losing 
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the thread that would have returned them to the world. For this reason among others, 
Nietzsche tried to reject the Platonic tradition, but he may have inadvertently supplied 
it with the straightforward answer to this question that it was seeking all along. His 
cosmic dramatist stages a tragedy for its own sake, for beauty alone, because “only as 
an aesthetic phenomenon are existence and the world justified to eternity.”76  
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42 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “On the Despisers of the Body.” 
43 Beyond Good and Evil 1.19. 
44 Thus Spoke Zarathustra 2, “On Self-Overcoming.” “Such,” he adds, “is the nature of the 
living.” 
45 Against the Logicians 1.310–12. 
46 Republic 4.430e11–431a1. This is a slight adaptation of the translation that appears in Reeve 
2004 (“command” has been substituted for “control,” in order to keep consistent the terms of 
Plato and Nietzsche on this question). All translations of other Platonic dialogues, besides 
Republic, are from Cooper 1997. 
47 167a–169c. See also Aristotle, De Anima 3.2, 425b12–28, where a related puzzle arises for 
vision. For a discussion, see Sorabji 2006:201–11. Plotinus responds directly to Sextus, it 
seems, in Ennead 5.3 (especially 5.3.1–2), but his Platonist response is, not surprisingly, already 
scattered throughout Plato.  
48 Charmides 169a1–5. 
49 Alcibiades 129c2–e7. 
50 Alcibiades 130a1–c2. 
Avatars of Oneself 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
51 Republic 9.588d10–e1. 
52 Republic 9.588c2–5. 
53 See, e.g., Theaetetus 187a–210a, Meno 80d–86c, 97a–100b, and Phaedo 73c–77a, 78b–80b, 
Republic 5.474b–480a, 6.509d–511e. 
54 Alcibiades 133c7. For the Delphic inscriptions, see Charmides 164d4 and Alcibiades 129a2–4, 
132c9, as well as Phaedrus 229e6. For a similar equation in Charmides: 165a1 and 165c4–6. 
55 Even if it can be shown that (i) knowledge must be self-reflective, and that (ii) only 
something immaterial can be self-reflective, this does not show (iii) how the immaterial thing 
does this (that is, how exactly it avoids the pitfalls of material self-reflection). Showing this, 
(iii), is a principal task of Plotinus’s Enneads, especially the fifth (and particularly 5.3, 5.5, and 
5.9). 
56 Republic 10.611b9. 
57 Republic 10.611b1. 
58 Republic 10.611d9. 
59 Republic 7.514a–518c1. 
60 Republic 7.516e2 –5. 
61 Aphorisms 1.1. 
62 The story comes from the pseudo-Hesiodic Melampoda (Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed. 
1530). 
63 4.4.19. All translations of the Upanishads are from Radhakrishnan and Moore 1989. 
64 4.4.20. 
65 2.23.3. These two Upanishads are generally considered the earlier, from pre-Buddhist India, 
and are typically dated to the 7th or 6th century BCE, a century before Empedocles. 
66 For a fuller story of this doctrine’s transmission from India to Greece, see Miller 2011, ch. 
3.4–6, working especially with McEvilley 2001.  
67 DK 31B117. For Empedocles, and the other Pre-Platonic philosopher cited in this paper 
(Heraclitus), see McKirahan 2011. 
68 DK 31B127. 
69 DK 31B112. 
70 For a fuller account of this adoption, see Miller 2011, ch. 4. 
71 Phaedrus 250e1–4. 
72 Phaedo 81d5–82a8. See also Phaedrus 248d1 and 249b4, as well as Phaedo 82a–b and Timaeus 
90e ff. 
73 See, e.g., Phaedo 82b–c. A fuller account is available in Miller 2011, ch. 4.8. 
74 Phaedrus 246a–256e. 
75 Bhagavad Gita 10.8 
76 Birth of Tragedy 5. 
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